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"The transition period since the war has been a trying time for the 
Navy, and that it has been successfully weathered is a subject for 
congratulation. First came demobilization, with the discharge not 
only of the hundreds of thousands who had enlisted for the war, but 
also of thousands of regulars who, having completed their term of 
service, were unwilling to reenlist unless they were assured of an in-
crease in pay somewhat commensurate with what they could get in 
civil life. This resulted in a constant decrease in enlisted and 
commissioned strength until Congress granted an increase in pay. 
The situation was intensified by the completion of ships begun dur-
ing the war, causing greater demands for crews at the very time when 
trained men were leaving in large numbers. To stimulate recruiting 
it was necessary to resort to short-term enlistments, which enabled 
the Navy to tide over that period and keep the fighting ships in 
operation. Because of the demobilization and better financial oppor-
tunities in civil life the task of securing recruits has been difficult 
and expensive, but this is a temporary condition which always follows war." 
Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy (Fiscal Year 1920) p. 85 
EDITORIAL COMMENT: This week's feature on defense procurement was written by David 
Packard, Chairman of the Board Hewlett-Packard Co. and former Deputy Secretary of Defense 
from January 1969 to December 1971. In a time of decreasing procurement resources and 
increasing hardware requirements methods such as the one discussed in this article become 
vitally important. This feature appeared in the Defense Management Journal in July 1972. 
FEATURE: IMPROVING R&D MANAGEMENT THROUGH PROTOTYPING 
"As I joined Melvin Laird (Secretary of Defense) in the spring of 1969 to help in the 
management of the Department of Defense, one of the most serious problems we faced was 
th unsatisfactory record over the last decade of the Defense Department, the Military 
Services and the industry in the job of the development and procurement of new defense 
systems. 
During the three years of my tenure in office as Deputy Secretary of Defense, I had the 
opportunity to work on this problem in an extensive and detailed way. By the middle of 
1970, we had begun to delineate some policy changes which we believed would bring about 
improvement. These policy changes were covered in a number of memorandums, new directives, 
and other written statements by me and my associates, Dr. John Foster (Director of Defense 
Research and Engineering), Barry Shi11ito (Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations 
and Logistics)) and many others. 
I believe the thrust of these new policies was and is in the right direction and, in 
fact, considerable progress has already been made. We are by no means out of the woods 
and it will take a great deal more time and effort to correct the disastrous practices 
which have been developed by the so-called military-industrial complex over the past 
decade. 
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Cost overruns were the most visible symptom of the troubled new weapon development 
situation but there were other problems, too. Most programs took far too long from 
original conception until weapons were delivered to the operational military forces. 
As a result many weapons, particularly those involving electronics and other fast 
moving technology, were out of date by the time they were available. 
To compound the problem, even after exorbitantly high cost and unnecessarily long 
development time, many of the new devices did not have the reliability that is needed 
for military use. Short mean time between failure resulted in less than satisfactory 
performance and low availability of important weapons to the forces. 
I believe we have learned a great deal during the past three years in understanding the 
causes of these difficulties. We were able to take a number of specific steps which 
point the way to major improvement. 
As I have said many times, however, only if the people in the Defense Department and in 
the Services find new and better ways to work with industry will these serious deficiencies 
be corrected. Major changes are absolutely necessary by both industry and the Government 
if this country is to receive the value for the defense dollar that it deserves. Major 
changes are absolutely necessary by both industry and the Government if we are to have the 
military capability adequate for the future security of America and the free world. 
PROBLEM OF ESTIMATING COST 
One of the major factors in cost overruns has been irresponsible low estimates at the 
beginning of a program. "Buy-ins" by contractors has been a big element of this irresons-
ibility. Another contributing factor has been the attempt to price out a full program 
before the new weapon is developed. There are tools such as parametric costing which will 
help in making reasonably accurate cost estimates of a new product before it is developed, 
but apparently those in authority preferred to rely on wishful thinking. The record is 
nothing anyone can be proud of. 
Prototyping can help in this matter because this approach will allow new weapon development 
to be undertaken, without having to make a commitment to production or to use by operational 
forces before the development is complete. 
Of course, there should be a verified need for the weapon before money is spent on the 
prototype, but projecting the program cost including the production cost can be delayed 
until the prototype is complete and tested. With a hardware model, better cost estimates 
are possible and there will be much less excuse for gross errors in projecting a program 
cost. 
Buy-ins can also be reduced with the prototype approach, if the people in the Defense 
Department have the guts to go to sole source negotiated contracts with the firm that 
demonstrates it can do the job by producing a prototype which is proven by testing. 
These false cost estimates and buy-ins are not cost overruns that necessarily represent 
real waste, but they ensure that a program will look like money has been wasted. They 
are in the nature of conspicuous waste. They give the critics and the press the 
opportunity to make the Defense Department and industry look stupid. The defense 
community will continue to look stupid until and unless this situation of absurdly low-
cost estimes and buy-ins is corrected. 
DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING BEFORE PRODUCTION 
There are some practices in this business which are real waste rather than conspicuous 
waste. There has been real waste of both time and money in almost every program in which 
production was started before development and testing was complete. That includes almost 
every program. 
Engineering changes that are made on the production line are costly and wasteful. They 
generate waste, real waste, right down through the subcontract structure. 
Hundreds of millions of dollars have been wasted buying spare parts before the final 
design is settled and before the real requirements for spares have been confirmed. A 
recent report by the General Accounting Office (GAO) found over a hundred million dollars 
wasted on spares on one program alone. I happen to know the GAO was right in making 
this conclusion. 
Prototypes-hardware models-and adequate testing before production can be a major step 
forward to correct some of the disastrous failings characteristic of the total defense 
system approach and the total package procurement. 
-3-
I hope this prototype approach will be considered as one big step toward a new way of 
life in this business-for a new way of life is what we need. 
It will be helpful to consider the prototype approach in two separate phases, each of which 
can serve to correct some of the serious failings we have had in this business. The advanced 
prototype is one kind of a prototype program. The production prototype is another kind 
of a prototype program. Each has its place. Each can contribute to a better job in the 
future. 
The advanced prototype can serve to verify and reduce the technology of hardware. It can 
also serve to evaluate the operational concept of the new weapo~. Let me emphasize that the 
advanced prototype should not be tied to a completely firm program. The advanced prototype 
p- ogram should be administered whenever possible to provide alternate choices for the force 
requirement. In the past, alternate choices for a force requirement have been evaluated 
by paper studies, system analysis procedures, and they have been influenced by the divisive 
forces between the Services and often with a Service. 
By the time the fighting is over and a particular program is selected, the whole issue 
is set in concrete and can hardly be changed by an act of Congress. This process has often 
resulted in a poor decision with no possibility that it can be corrected later. 
If the decision on which way to go can be kept open until several alternate routes have 
been evaluated by building and testing prototypes, I am sure we will have better decisions 
on the question of what weapons to develop for our future forces. 
Once an advanced prototype has been selected as the basis for a major program, there will 
be much yet to be done in engineering before a commitment to production is made. Here 
is the place for more reliance on production prototypes. These should be built to a 
production design on production tooling and with production methods. It is only when 
Government and industry face up to the fact that production prototypes must be built and 
tested before major investment in production, before deciding on and orderning spares, 
before taking actions for training and deployment, that the problem that has been plaguing 
defense system development in the past will be solved. 
There are many who will claim that waiting for the production prototype to be tested 
before taking corollary actions on a major program will result in delays. Let me emphasize 
that in the three years I spent in the Pentagon I found hardly a program that was not 
delayed anyway. I found hardly a program that would not have been in better shape if it 
had been planned and managed from the beginning to complete the development and testing 
before getting too far along in production. In the past, delays have been incurred and 
hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent unnecessarily. I visited an Air Force 
base just recently where there were hundreds of students and instructors and extensive 
investments to train pilots for C-SAs. They had three C-SAs there all right, but none had 
engines and none could fly. 
Wouldn't it have made more sense to have completed the development of the C-SA, to have 
tested it and proven the design before all that money was spent on production and deployment. 
We had no urgent need for the capability. It would have made so much more sense to do 
the job right. Judicious use of prototypes can help avoid such performance in the future. 
SYSTEM PROGRAM RELIABILITY 
The third serious problem that troubles all of our recent major programs is reliability. 
N~rous directives, specifications, and other requirements have been placed on all major 
development programs to attempt to improve the reliability of new weapons. Very little 
improvement, if any, has come from this effort and very large sums of money have been 
spent. 
Reliability cannot be achieved by adhering to detailed specifications. Reliability 
cannot be achieved by formula or by analysis. Some of these may help to some extent but 
there is only one road to reliability. Build it, test it, and fix the things that go 
wrong. Repeat the process until the desired reliability is achieved. It is a feedback 
process and there is no other way. Prototypes are an important key to this procedure. 
If reliability is a design objective of both advanced and production prototypes, and if 
the testing of both includes testing for reliability, real progress will be made. 
A few months ago at a meeting of military project managers, someone objected to extensive 
testing because it would delay the program. He complained that testing showed up things 
that needed to be fixed and it took time to fix them, and this would delay the initial 
operating capability. Unless we get rid of that kind of thinking there will be no hope. 
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Prototyping must be backed with testing, and schedules must not be fixed until we have 
a hardware model that meets the requirement of the job and which has demonstrated reliability. 
Proto typing is not new-we don't need a new kind of program. What we need is new thinking-
an honest approach to this enormously complex and important problem. Most will say proto-
typing is not the complete solution to this problem. I agree, but I believe proto typing 
is a step which has an important place in making the kinds of improvement that must be 
made. More important, prototyping can engender a new kind of thinking-a fresh approach to 
this all important responsibility people throughout the Government and industry carry 
on their shoulders. 
SUMMARY 
Let me repeat what I said at the beginning. I believe we have made real and important 
progress in improving the management of the development and production of new weapons ~ 
during these last three years. What has been done is only a beginning-critics are far from 
satisfied and among them are influential members of the Congress. 
I am, however, very encouraged by the great progress we made during these past three 
years. The most encouraging fact of all is that the majority of people in the Defense 
Department, in industry, and in the Congress seemed to agree with what we did and gave me 
excellent support the entire time I was in the Pentagon. 
I have often said that the new policies we established, and the improvements we tried 
to make, will be effective only to the extent they are accepted and implemented by people 
throughout the Defense Department and throughout industry. I also recognized that it 
would take considerable time for these new policies to become effective, even if they are 
correct and proper. 
People in the Department of Defense and in the Services, who are responsible for making 
decisions and working with their counterparts in industry on specific programs and specific 
projects, are the ones-in fact, the only ones-who can bring about the improvement we must 
have. 
Let me make this point very clear. We can convert our critics in only one way-by doing 
a better job. That is the sole purpose of the prototype approach-the opportunity to 
demonstrate that you know what you are doing before vast sums of money are committed to 
a new major program. 
I believe the prototype approach can contibute to better thinking, better habits on 
the entire spectrum of defense contracting. 
The Defense Department, the Military Services, and defense industry have an awesome 
responsibility to provide the weapons this country needs to assure realistic capability 
to deter war for the future. It is their responsibility provide these weapons with 
resources which will not weaken our economy, for in today's world economic strength is a 
most important adjunct to military strength. 
American industry has been the most productive and the most innovative of any industry 
in the world. American industry has been the arsenal of democracy and the savior of the 
free world on at least five separate occasions in our history, going clear back to the 
19th century. 
America looks to the defense industry and the Defense Department to live up to this 
great tradition of service to the nation. I am confident enough to say we have stBered , 
these great resources back on the right track." 
SERVICE NOTE: Prime Minister E. G. Whitlam of Australia can't keep a secret. Speaking ' to 
the National Press Club during a recent visit to this country, the tall, ruddy-faced 
visitor from Down Under blew the cover on the U.S. Navy communications station at North 
West Cape in his country. While the Pentagon has assiduously kept the purpose of the 
installation classified, Whitlam, who is head of the Labour Party in Australia, told the 
NPC audience the station is used to send messages to submerged American Navy submarines. 
Presumably, the messages go to both Polaris-Poseidon ballistic missile and nuclear-powered 
attack submarines. "Australia is not privy to those communications," he said, with a 
pained expression. "The agreement was made 10 years ago. No nation would now make 
such arrangements and the United States would not expect any nation to do so." He 
indicated strongly he wants to change the arrangement. "My Minister of Defense is 
coming here (to Washington) at the end of the year to discuss the operation of this 
base," he said. Question: Will Whitlam soon be reading the U.S . Navy's mail? 
SEAPOWER (SEPTEMBER 1973) 
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FEATURE: UNIFIED, SPECIFIED COMMANDS PROTECT NATION'S SECURITY 
What are Unified and Specified Commands? How do they function? These are some of the 
questions that often are asked by members of the U.S. Armed Forces. 
Specifically, a Unified Command is a combat command with a broad and continuing mission, 
composed of forces of two or more Services under a single commander. A Specified Command 
also is a combat command with a broad and continuing mission; however, it normally is 
composed of forces of only one Service. Commands of both types are established by the 
President of the United States, through the Secretary of Defense, with the advice and 
assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
In other words, Unified and Specified Commands are the cutting edge of the entire D~ense establishment. These are the major combatant commands. The entire Department 
of Defense organization exists for the sole purpose of making them effective as fighting 
units to protect the security of the United States. 
But, how did they come about? Why was there a need for Unified and Specified Commands? 
To provide the answers, it is helpful to review the evolution of U.S. military 
organizations, especially during the past quarter of a centry. For illustrative purposes, 
it must be considered that if the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force are the 
backbone of today's Department of Defense from the standpoint of personnel, training and 
logistical support, then the Unified and Specified Commands provide the muscle from the 
standpoint of combat readiness. 
THE PERIOD OF DEVELOPMENT 
Organization of America's defenses under the War Department, which was established by 
the Congress in 1789, and the Navy Department, established in 1798, proved to be adequate 
throughout the 19th centry and the early decades of the 20th. Service responsibilities, 
roles and missions were usually distinct and separate. The War Department was primarily 
concerned with assisting the westward march of the rapidly growing United States; the 
Navy Department was responsible for insuring the freedom of the seas for American shipping 
and protecting American coastal waters. 
Although those early defense establishments were able to cope with expanding roles and 
operations, the adequacy of separate organization and command came to an end with World 
War II. Both the complexity of the art of warfare in the mid-20th centry and the vast 
problems presented by fighting a war on a global scale required the Army and Navy to 
plan together and to operate together in far-flung combat theaters. Also, military 
aircraft had grown into a formidable weapon and added a third dimension to warfare. 
As American military operations in World War II expanded to North Africa and Europe on 
one side of the world, and the far reaches of the Pacific on the other, President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt established in 1942 a strategic planning body called the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
Admiral William D. Leahy, the Chief of Staff to the President; Army Chief of Staff General 
George C. Marshall; Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest J. King; and Army Air Corps 
General Henry H. Arnold became the first members of this distinguished group. Also, an 
overall commander of U.S. land, sea and air forces was assigned to each of the major war 
theaters to increase combat effectiveness. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff combined their experience and knowledge of land, sea and air 
wa~fare to develop strategic plans and to advise the President on the conduct of the war. 
Thie commanders of the joint forces in the European and Pacific combat theaters translated 
strategic plans and the President's decisions into action. Joint planning and operations 
contributed greatly to the final Allied victories. 
RAPID EVOLUTION 
World War II experiences and the emergence of the United States as a leader in the 
postwar world showed a need for basic changes in the organization of America's defense 
structure. Army ground forces, the Navy, and the emergent Army Air Corps could not operate 
independent of each other. 
To resolve this situation and to insure that combatant forces would be employed under 
unified strategic direction, the National Security Act of 1947 was enacted by Congress after 
two years of study and debate. It established a National Military Establishment with a 
Secretary of Defense, established the Air Force to form a third separate Military Department, 
and confirmed the continuance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
. . . ' .... 
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When a stroke of the Presidential pen endorsed this newly enacted legislation, the 
Army, the Navy (including the U.S. Marine Corps) and the Air Force were directed to train, 
supply, administer and support their respective forces for land, sea and air operations. 
Responsibility of operational direction of combat forces around the world was shifted from 
the individual Services to Unified and Specified Commanders who reported directly to the 
Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
REFINING DOD OPERATIONS 
More organizational changes in the Department of Defense were made by the Congress in 
the 1950s after receiving recommendations from President Dwight D. Eisenhower. 
The Secretary of Defense was given greater managerial flexibility in 1953. The 
President made it clear that no function in the Department of Defense was to be carried 
out independently of the authority of the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretaries of t , 
Army, Navy and Air Force were to be his principal operating managers for the management 
and directior of the U.S. Armed Forces. 
The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 further increased the Defense 
Secretary's authority, particularly in the operational direction of the Unified and 
Specified Commands. 
The 1958 legislation: 
'Further clarified the authority of the Secretary of Defense over the Military 
Departments; 
'Provided specific procedures for adjusting the functions of the Military 
Departments; 
'Continued the ban against merging of the Military Departments or the setting up 
of a single Chief of Staff or an overall Armed Forces General Staff; 
'Streamlined command channels by providing "a clear and direct line of command 
from the President to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the 
Unified and Specified Commands"; and 
·GaN.e the commander of a Unified or Specified Command full operational command 
over his assigned forces. 
CONTINUED IMPROVEMENT 
Although this basic defense structure was logical and workable, two major deficiencies 
remained to be corrected. First, some of the combat-ready forces had not yet been placed 
under the Unified and Specified Command structure. Second, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had 
yet to be provided the organizational and management tools they needed to give the most 
effective day-to-day operational direction to the Unified and Specified Commands. 
The first deficiency was corrected in October 1961 by creating the U.S. Strike Command 
(now the U.S. Readiness Command) as a new Unified Command. This put under a single Unified 
Command all of the United States continental-based, combat-ready forces not assigned to the 
Strategic Air Command, Continental Air Command or other Unified Command. Previously, 
such forces had been controlled by their respective Services. With this change, all 
combat-ready forces were assigned within the Unified and Specified Command structure. 
To eliminate the second deficiency, the internal organization of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and their various support functions were reviewed to determine what improvements 
might be necessary to hone the defense organization. .~ 
It was found that two combat support functions of utmost importance to field commanders-
intelligence and communications-were still being performed independently by the three 
Military Departments. The result was insufficient coordination with the operational 
direction of combat forces in the field. The solution to this problem was to consolidate 
these two important functions into two new Defense agencies - Defense Intelligence Agency 
and Defense Communications Agency-with both reporting through the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
to the Secretary of Defense. 
Because the defense agency rearrangement proved to be so effective, there are now 
several such agencies which serve Unified and Specified Commanders and the Defense Depart-
ment. These agencies are: National Security Agency/Central Security Service, Defense 
Supply Agency, Defense Nuclear Agency, Defense Communications Agency, Defense Intelligence 
Agency, Defense Contract Audit Agency, Defense Mapping Agency, Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency, Defense Security Assistance Agency, the Defense Civil Preparedness 
Agency and Defense Investigative Service. 
COMMANDERS DIGEST JUNE 28, 1973 
